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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Comment on Recent Decisions
BILLS AND NOTES--BONDS--INCORPORATION OF DEED Or TRUST-EFFECT
OF LIMITING RIGHT TO SUE ON NEGOTIABILiTY.-Plaintiff brings an action
in replevin to recover several bonds and coupons against the trustee to
whom the bonds were sent for registration but who refused to register or
return them because the bonds were stolen from the co-defendant. The
bonds referred to the deed of trust not only for a description of the prop-
erty rights and franchises mortgaged and the nature and extent of the
security, but also for the terms and conditions upon which the bonds were
issued and secured with the same effect as if the provisions were ex-
pressly set forth in the bonds. Held, that the bonds incorporated the pro-
visions of the deed of trust, and a provision that no holder of any bond or
coupon secured by the deed of trust shall have any right as such holder to
institute any suit, action, a proceeding, in equity or at law on account of
any such bond or coupon, but that all rights shall be vested exclusively in
the trustee, rendered the bonds non-negotiable, so that the plaintiff could
not recover. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Mississippi Valley-Merchants State
Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1931) 41 S. W. (2d) 962.
An early test laid down in English decisions to determine the negotia-
bility of an instrument was whether the instrument was, by custom, trans-
ferable by delivery, like money, and whether it was capable of being sued
upon by the holder. Crouch v. Credit Foncier of England (1873) L. R. 8,
Q. B. 374; Jones & Co. v. Country (1909) 2 K. B. 1029. The effect of a
holder being denied the right to sue on the negotiability of an instrument
was first determined in Glyn v. Baker (1811) 13 East. 509, where bonds
issued by the Government of India were declared non-negotiable because no
other person could have sued on them but the obligee. A remedial statute,
51 Geo. III, c64 (1811) was later passed.
In this country, after the adoption of the Negotiable Instrument Laws,
it was questionable at first, whether they applied to bonds. Pratt v. Hig-
ginson (1918) 230 Mass. 256, 119 N. E. 661, 1 A. L. R. 714; note (1924) 24
COL. L. REv. 563; Brannon, NEGOTIBLE INSTRUMENTS (4th ed. 1926) 13-16.
Bonds secured by trust deeds which were incorporated in the bonds were
held non-negotiable because of the necessary reference to extrinsic facts.
King Cattle Co. v. Joseph (1924) 158 Minn. 481, 198 N. W. 798. The better
view is that if the bonds are negotiable on their face, the mere incorpora-
tion does not render the bonds non-negotiable but that the terms of the
bond and the trust deed as a whole should be examined to determine if they
are compatible with negotiability. Hubbard v. R. B. Wallace Co. (1926)
210 Iowa 1143, 208 N. W. 730; Williams v. Silverdein (Cal. App. 1930)
293 Pac. 102; Morgan v. Mulcahey (Mo. App. 1927) 298 S. W. 242.
The essential requirements of negotiability under the Negotiable Instru-
ment Laws is that the instrument should provide for the unconditional
payment to a person or order, or bearer, of a certain sum of money at a
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time capable of exact ascertainment. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2630; Daniels,
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (1914) secs. 27-104. Where the fulfillment of
conditions in the bonds was made precedent to the right of the holder to sue
the maker, the bonds containing these provisions were held non-negotiable
because the payment was subject to a contingency not in the control of the
holder. St. Louis-Carterville Coal Co. v. Southern Coal Co. (1916) 194 Mo.
App. 598, 186 S. W. 1152; Evertson v. Bank of Newport (1876) 66 N. Y.
14; McClelland v. Norfolk S. R. Co. (1888) 110 N. Y. 469, 18 N. E. 237, 1
L. R. A. 299. A provision expressly excluding the right to sue on the bond
in any action will be binding on the holder and a bar to any proceeding
brought against the maker. Reitz v. Pontiac Realty Co. (Mo. 1927) 293
S. W. 382; Kimber v. Gunnell Min. & Mil. Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1903) 126 Fed. 137.
The effects of this provision upon the rights of a holder against the maker's
liability at maturity or on a default are distinguishable from its effects upon
the negotiability of the instrument before its maturity on a default. In the
principal case the right to demand payment is not abrogated when the
instrument matures or becomes due by reason of a default, even though the
collectibility of the instrument is unquestionably hampered by the pro-
visions denying the holder a right to bring an action of the bond. The Ne-
gotiable Instrument Laws, however, do not prescribe the right of a holder
to sue in his own name as a necessary element of negotiability. Palpke aV.
Paine (Mich. 1931) 235 N. W. 871. In this case the provision was con-
strued as an agreement by the holders to appoint the trustee as their agent
for the purpose of bringing actions. A similar interpretation could be
given to the provision of the principal case. Equitable aid could be em-
ployed by the holder to force the trustee to perform the office efficiently for
the purpose intended.
The bonds in the principal case contain provisions that are becoming
common to bonds issued by business corporations and railroads. The right
of a holder to sue on an instrument as a basis for determining its negotia-
bility is a common-law distinction which would seem unimportant in the
light of the purpose for which the bonds are issued and purchased. On
the face of these bonds, it is stated that they are to be negotiable; and
though this mere statement will not render a bond negotiable, if of itself it
does not satisfy the requirements of the Negotiable Instrument Laws, it
may be evidence of the intent of transferors and transferees to treat the
instrument as negotiable. These bonds are to be construed as incorporating
and becoming subject to the provision of the deed of trust but the inter-
pretation of this incorporation is subject to the query whether the purpose
of negotiability, the transfer of instruments of credit with the freedom of
money, is impeded by provisions not contained in the bond itself.
Statutes in several states provide that if an instrument is negotiable on
its face, such negotiability is not destroyed by any conditions contained in
the mortgage or deed of trust securing the same. Under such a statute, a
different result might have been reached. Utah Laws (1923) c. 2. Suben-
hauer a. Bank of Calif. Nat. Ass'n (Cal. 1930) 294 Pac. 1062. L.,S., '33.
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